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What is the status of time in accounts of differentiated integration? What do theories 
of  integration  and  Europeanisation  have  to  say  about  time  both  as  a  property  of 
differentiated  integration  and,  in  particular,  as  part  of  their  explanatory  accounts? 
Time as a property of differentiated integration is not too difficult to grasp, but the 
status  of  time  as  part  of  an  explanation  of  differentiated  integration  is  more 
amorphous. What matters here, in particular, are arguments relating (i) to the impact 
of  the  passage  of  time;  (ii)  time  budgets  and  time  horizons;  and  (iii)  time  rules, 
notably those relating to timing, sequence, speed and duration. The paper sets out how 
such  temporal-causal  categories  have  informed  theorizing  on  integration  and 
Europeanization and how they might help to account for differentiated integration. It 
also highlights the pluritemporality that characterises the EU timescape and notes how 
this facilitates and encourages recourse to differentiated integration. In sum, paying 
attention  to  its  temporality  helps  advance  our  understanding  of  differentiated 











* This paper has been prepared within the context of the activities of Team 26 of EU-
CONSENT on the ‘Temporality of Europeanisation and Enlargement’, led by K. H. 
Goetz and J.-H. Meyer-Sahling (University of Nottingham). The paper has benefited, 
in particular, from ideas exchanged at the EU-CONSENT Workshop on Political Time 
and Political Science, 2-3 April 2009, University of Potsdam.    2 
I. Why Time Matters
1  
 
Political  and  academic  debate  surrounding  the  phenomenon  of  differentiated 
integration  is  replete  with  time-centred  images  and  metaphors.
2  In  Stubb’s  (1996) 
categorization, time is one of the three main variables of differentiated integration, the 
other  being  “space”  and  “matter”  and  more  recent  contributions  employ  similar 
distinctions (de Neve 2007; Andersen and Sitter 2006). Notions frequently employed 
in discussions of temporal differentiation include, for example, multi-speed Europe, 
vanguards  or  laggards.  Following  Stubb,  major  examples  of  such  temporal 
differentiation  include  transition  periods,  temporary  derogations  or  the  temporal 
structuring of EMU and of the adoption of the single currency (see also Dyson 2009). 
Temporal differentiation, understood in this way, differs from “variable geometry” 
and an à la carte approach in that it does not question common objectives, but rather 
allows for “a core group of Member States which are both able and willing to pursue 
some  policy  areas  further,  the  assumption  being  that  the  others  will  follow  later” 
(Stubb 1996: 287).  
 
Differentiated integration is, thus, intimately connected to time. If we try to think 
systematically  about  the  nature  of  the  linkages  involved,  there  are  least  two 
dimensions to be explored: the temporal properties of differentiated integration; and 
time as part of an explanatory account of differentiated integration.    
 
Time  as  a  property  of  differentiated  integration:  the  basic,  although  very  broad, 
question  here  is  in  what  ways  differentiated  integration  is  about  temporality. 
Sequencing  –  notably  the  order  in  which  member  states  assume  new  policy 
commitments and integrate into EU-wide institutional arrangements - is of central 
importance here, but there are other temporal categories to consider, including, in 
particular, timing, speed and duration (see below). As regards duration, it is important 
to ask whether temporal differentiation is inherently a transitional phenomenon, as 
suggested by Stubb – different states moving at different times, different speeds and, 
perhaps,  in  different  policy  sequences  but  ultimately  arriving,  “in  their  own  good 
time” at a common goal – or involves open-ended, (semi-)permanent differences. The 
latter prospect is, e. g., raised by Přibáň (2009) who suggests in the context of his 
discussion of legal integration that flexibility clauses, whilst they may initially have 
been understood as temporary measures, have changed in character: “the indefinite 
design and persistence of some clauses, such as the Irish and UK opt-outs from the 
Schengen Zone or the UK opt-outs from the Union’s protection of social rights, have 
                                                 
1  The  present  paper  has  been  written  as  a  draft  contribution  to  an  edited  volume  on 
differentiated integration by K. Dyson and A. Sepos (eds.) Whose Europe? The Politics of 
Differentiated  Integration  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave,  forthcoming).  It  forms  part  of  the 
theoretical introduction to the edited volume and stands next to two chapters on differentiated 
integration  and  territory  and  function  (sectors)  by  Michael  Keating  (2009)  and  Alkuin 
Koelliker (2009) respectively. The authors of these three chapters have been asked by the 
editors  to  highlight  how  time,  territory  and  function  may  help  to  shed  light  on  the 
phenomenon of differentiated integration.  
2 There is, by now, a fairly extensive literature that defines differentiated integration, 
documents the practice and accounts for its apparent rise. See Dyson and Sepos 2008 and de 
Neve (2007) for two recent surveys of the field. Major attempts to provide theoretically 
informed explanations for the rise of the phenomenon include Stubb (1996; 2002), Warleigh 
(2002) and Koelliker (2004; 2006).     3 
gradually weakened the original idea of flexibility as a transitional measure and made 
it an intrinsic feature of European legal integration”.  
 
Next to analysing patterns of temporal differentiation, appreciating the potential of, 
and limitations to, differentiated integration as a political strategy (Dyson and Sepos 
2008) also requires us to consider temporal patterns of differentiation. For example, 
when have “flexible” arrangements been introduced and terminated? Has this been a 
cyclical or a more linear process? Are there distinct sequences that can be identified, 
e.g., between formal treaty reforms and a prior or subsequent spread of differentiated 
arrangements? What can we say about the speed with which such arrangements have 
been introduced or abolished? Answering the latter question helps us to judge whether 
differentiation is a short-term expediency or part of longer-term institutional design. 
And what do we know about the duration of differentiated institutional, decision-
making and policy arrangements? For example, if one compares different enlargement 
rounds, has there been a lengthening or a shortening of transitional arrangements and 
temporary  derogations?  If  this  were  to  be  the  case,  it  might  indicate  that  full 
integration is becoming ever more difficult to achieve.    
 
Time as part of the explanation of differentiated integration: To ask how time may 
promote, facilitate or impede differentiated integration raises a broad range of issues. 
In the present context, I want to tackle this question from two main perspectives. 
First, what do integration theory and Europeanisation theories have to say on time and 
(differentiated) integration? What is the analytical status of time in these accounts? 
The answer I am able to give is far from exhaustive. However, I want to illustrate that 
time is often accorded a central role by briefly commenting on Schmitter’s (1970, 
2004) notion of initiation, priming and transformative cycles in integration; Pierson’s 
arguments  about  the  importance  of  short-term  time  horizons  and  long-term 
consequences in explaining the trajectory of integration; and Moravscik’s emphasis 
on the importance of credible commitments in explaining decisions on the pooling 
and delegation of sovereignty. I also look at work that seeks to explain patterns of 
Europeanisation - notably “clustered Europeanisation” (Goetz 2006, 2007) – that are 
related to the institutional and policy effects typically associated with differentiated 
integration.  
 
Second, what follows from the specificities of the EU timescape (Meyer-Sahling and 
Goetz 2009, Goetz 2009), i.e. the configuration of political time in the EU at the 
levels of institutions, decision-making procedures and public policies? The argument 
to be explored here is that the pluritemporality of the EU provides a fertile ground for 
differentiated integration. Not only is there no dominant time-setter in the EU; it also 
has only limited time-setting powers vis-à-vis its member states and hence its ability 
to restrict de facto temporal differentiation is quite closely circumscribed.  
 
The remainder of this paper explores the questions and arguments just outlined in 
some more depth. It first considers different ways in which time features in political 
science accounts, including work that stresses the importance of the passage of time; 
time budgets and time horizons; and timing, sequence, speed and duration. Next, the 
paper  discusses  temporal  properties  of  differentiated  integration,  distinguishing 
between patterns of temporal differentiation and temporal patterns of differentiation.  
The next sections then ask how time affects differentiated integration. In this context, 
I  highlight,  in  particular,  the  explanatory  status  of  time  in  integration  theory  and   4 
accounts of clustered Europeanization; and note the implications of the EU timescape 
for  differentiation.  The  paper  concludes  by  highlighting  the  advantages  of  time-
sensitive analyses of EU integration.   
 
 
II. How Time Matters 
 
Enquiring into time and differentiated integration means to engage with a broad, but 
also  quite  diverse,  literature  on  political  time  in  political  science.  Although  most 
political  scientists  would  readily  agree  that  the  manner  in  which  political  time  is 
configured is vital to understanding how a political system works, the link between 
time and politics is rarely systematically explored. There is no ‘received wisdom’ 
about the key questions to be asked and the theoretical lenses to be adopted and little 
by way of an empirical ‘state of the art’. As Schedler and Santiso (1998) noted in their 
“invitation” from the late 1990s to concentrate research on “political time”, “[t]ime in 
its manifold manifestations represents a pervasive factor in political life”, but “as a 
rule,  reflections  on  politics  and  time  have  remained  unsystematic,  implicit,  and 
disperse, and our theoretical insights, conceptual tools, and empirical knowledge have 
remained severely limited” (ibid.: 5).  
 
In their “invitation”, Schedler and Santiso suggest that two broad perspectives may be 
adopted: time as a horizon and time as a resource. The first is concerned with the time 
horizons within which political systems operate, “their past, their present, their future” 
(ibid.: 6). The latter probes the implications of the scarcity of time in democratic 
politics. Under this rubric, political scientists have studied, in particular, time rules, 
i.e., “rules that define the temporal structures or the timetables of democratic politics, 
its time budgets, its points of initiation and termination, its pace, its sequences, and its 
cycles”  (ibid.:  8);  time  strategies,  i.e.,  strategies  of  how  to  manage  temporal 
constraints;  time  discourses,  i.e.,  political  controversies  about  the  “rights”  and 
“wrongs” of temporal decisions (ibid.: 12f); and “time traces”, i.e., the manner in 
which the “passage of time leaves its own imprint on certain structures and processes” 
(ibid.: 13, emphasis in the original).  
 
More recently, with explicit reference to political time in the EU, Goetz and Meyer-
Sahling (2009) have suggested to concentrate research efforts on the polity dimension 
of political time, which they equate with (the length of) mandates, time budgets and 
time  horizons;  the  politics  dimension,  which  is  about  rules  relating  to  timing, 
sequencing,  speed  and  duration  in  political  decision-making;  and  the  policy 
dimension,  which  concerns  temporal  policy  features,  such  as  the  intertemporal 
distribution of costs and benefits in major EU policies.  
 
In line with the focus of the present discussion, three of these takes on time deserve 
brief elaboration. In each case, we can distinguish further between temporal properties 
– time as part of the ‘dependent variable’ – and time as an explanation – i.e. time as 
part  of  the  ‘independent  variable’.  First,  there  is  the  passage  of  time,  which  is, 
perhaps, the most basic way in which time matters; it is closely associated with the 
interest  in  specific  historical-temporal  constellations.  Where  time  is  treated  as  a 
‘dependent  variable’,  this  perspective  is,  in  particular,  concerned  with  identifying 
phases, stages, eras, epochs or cycles of political development, i.e. it tries to bring 
order to the seemingly incessant flow of time by ‘parcelling up’ historical time, as   5 
when, e.g., analysts seek to distinguish between ‘peaks’ and ‘troughs’ in the history of 
European integration. Where time is treated as independent variable, the argument is 
essentially about the ‘weight of history’, i.e. the impact of the past upon the present 
and  the  future.  Such  arguments  come  in  many  guises,  as,  e.g.,  in  historical-
institutionalist analyses, with their emphasis on long-term processes and associated 
“slow-moving causal processes”, such as cumulative causes, threshold effects, causal 
chains, cumulative outcomes, structural effects or path dependencies and feedback 
loops (Pierson 2004: 79ff); constructivist accounts that emphasise the importance of 
‘time-consuming’  processes  underlying  political  change,  such  as  learning, 
socialisation  or  routinization;  or  rationalist  explanations  of  decision-taking  that 
highlight the importance of reiteration. Closely associated with such an agenda is the 
search  for  specific  historical  moments  (or  temporal  locations  in  time)  that  hold 
explanatory power, such as ‘critical junctures’. 
 
Second, (the length of) mandates, the time budgets of actors and the time horizons of 
individuals and organisations matter and differ markedly across political systems. As 
a dependent variable, mandates, time budgets and time horizons are fundamental to 
the characterisation of political system. After all, as Linz (1998) has reminded us, 
government pro tempore – i.e. mandates limited in time - is a - or perhaps the - 
defining  feature  of  democracies:  “The  pro-tempore  character  of  democratic 
government makes it essential that elections take place with reasonable frequency” 
(ibid.: 21). The limited time budget resulting from regular elections makes time a 
“scarce  resource”  (ibid.:  22)  in  democratic  politics  and  democratic  politicians,  in 
particular,  an  “harried  elite”  (ibid.:  29).  Following  Linz,  this  inbuilt  restriction  of 
democratic time has a profound impact on the temporal ordering of the activities of 
governments  and  parliaments  and  the  electoral  cycle  is  widely  recognised  to 
constitute the basic rhythm of a democratic political system, as it reflects recurring 
patterns of political processes, marked by a clear beginning and an end. 
 
But  lengths  of  mandates,  time  budgets  and  time  horizons  are  also  frequently 
employed in explanatory accounts of political developments. In this connection, one 
thinks, e.g., of work on political business cycles, which has noted the link between 
electoral rules, resultant time budgets and time horizons of political decision-makers, 
on the one hand, and the ‘opportunistic’ timing of economic policy tools, on the other 
(for a review of much this work see Drazen 2001); on time pressures and political 
negotiations (reviewed in Conceição-Heldt 2009); or the explanatory value given to 
differences  in  the  time  horizons  of  actors  in  historical-institutionalist  accounts  of 
integration (Pierson 1996; 2004; see below).  
 
Thirdly, timing – when something happens; sequence – in what order things happen; 
speed – how fast things happen; and duration – for how long things happen – matter. 
They provide both important points of reference in describing political phenomena 
and, in particular, in explanations of politics. As regards the latter, political time is 
often understood as a resource  and a constraint in decision-making. What matters 
critically in this respect is the malleability and manipulability of time. As Schmitter 
and Santiso (1998: 71) have noted in relation to democratisation, decision-makers 
“learn how to manipulate time, that is, to turn it from an inexorably limited, linear and 
perishable constraint into something that could be scheduled, anticipated, delayed, 
accelerated, deadlined, circumvented, prolonged, deferred, compressed, parcelled out, 
standardized, diversified, staged, staggered, and even wasted – but never ignored”.    6 
 
Analyses that examine the impact of temporal rules direct attention to how political 
actors may seek to influence temporal structures both within and between institutions. 
Such time rights include the power to initiate and thus to influence the timing for the 
start  of  the  political  processes;  they  refer  to  sequences  in  decision-making  –  a 
prominent concern in both rationalist and historical institutionalist analyses – and they 
are interested in possibilities to accelerate or delay. Time rules provide opportunities 
for  some  and  create  constraints  for  others.  From  this  perspective,  time  is 
fundamentally about the discretion to make choices in order to gain an advantage in 
political processes.  
  
As  the  following  sections  will  show,  time  rules  are  of  special  relevance  to  the 
characterisation  of  the  temporal  properties  of  differentiated  integration,  whilst  all 




III. The Temporal Properties of Differentiated Integration 
 
After this brief survey of why time matters and how it matters, let us now turn to the 
temporal  patterns  of  differentiated  integration.  To  what  extent  is  differentiated 
integration about temporal differentiation? This general question may be broken down 
into  two  more  specific  concerns  with  patterns  of  temporal  differentiation  and 
temporal patterns of differentiation. As regards the former, the policy dimension is 
the one most frequently discussed. Its practical importance has lately been underlined 
in the context of the EU enlargements of 2005 and 2007. As part of the enlargement 
negotiations, a host of temporary derogations of varying lengths were agreed; these 
covered chapters such as the free movement of goods, the freedom of movement of 
persons, the freedom of movement of services, and agriculture. They formed part of 
the Accession Treaties. There were also provisions regarding the phasing in of policy 
measures,  notably  as  regards  the  phasing  in  of  EU  agricultural  direct  payments 
between  2004  and  2013;  and  transitional  arrangements  such  as  the  “transition 
facility”, i.e. post-accession financial assistance to the new member states that could 
not benefit from the Structural Funds for the period of 2004-2006.  
 
As in previous enlargements, demands for temporary derogations did not just emerge 
from the applicant countries. Thus, existing member states were allowed to restrict 
full access from the new member states to their labour markets for a period of up to 
seven  years,  and  Austria  and  Germany  were  given  the  right  to  adopt  additional 
flanking measures. It is also worth remembering in this respect that a derogation does 
not necessarily equal the temporary acceptance of less stringent national regulations. 
For  example,  prior  to  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden  joining  the  EU,  “accession 
negotiations had been troubled by the insistence of all three newcomers that they be 
allowed to apply environmental standards that were stricter than many EU standards. 
This  sticking  point  was  resolved  by  allowing  the  applicants  to  apply  tougher 
legislation  for  up  to  four  years,  during  which  they  clearly  hoped  to  encourage  a 
ratcheting up of EU-wide standards” (Peterson and Bomberg 1998).  
  
Policy  differentiation  through  temporary  derogations,  the  adoption  of  transitional 
measures,  and  phasing  in  arrangements  that  apply  unequally  to  different  member   7 
states is at the heart of temporal differentiation, but the latter can also be observed at 
the level of institutions and decision-making procedures. A major example are the 
decision-making structures for dossiers relating to EMU and the Euro. Thus, member 
states whose currency is the Euro meet in the informal, but highly influential, body of 
the Eurogroup to deal with issues relating to EMU (Puetter 2006). The countries that 
have not secured a permanent opt-out (unlike Denmark and the UK), are, in principle, 
only temporarily excluded from this club. When the Ecofin Council, in which, of 
course, all member states are represented, deals with EMU and Euro dossiers, the 
temporary non-members and, of course, the permanent opt-outs do not take part in the 
vote.  Temporally  differentiated  policy  is,  thus,  associated  with  differentiation  in 
institutions and decision-making.     
 
Next to patterns of temporal differentiation, we also need to pay attention to temporal 
patterns of differentiation and how these have evolved over time, especially if we 
wish to get a better understanding of how differentiated integration has been used as a 
political strategy within the context of EU widening and deepening. The following 
questions  seem  especially  relevant:  When  have  “flexible”  arrangements  been 
introduced,  prolonged,  shortened  or  terminated?  This  question  concerns,  e.g.,  the 
timing  of  differentiated  arrangements  in  relation  to  stages  and  phases  of  the 
integration process; relative to treaty reforms, enlargements and major extensions of 
the  acquis;  or  relative  to  major  socio-economic  developments.  Second,  are  there 
distinct sequences in the introduction or termination of differentiated arrangements 
that can be identified? Such sequences relate, e.g., to chains that may lead from policy 
to  decision-making  to  organisational  differentiation;  or  sectoral  or  instrumental 
sequences.  
 
A third temporal consideration relates to the speed with which such arrangements 
have been introduced or abolished. Here, it is especially interesting to ask whether we 
can  identify  phases  of  acceleration  or  slowing  down  in  the  introduction  of 
differentiating measures and whether decisions on differentiation are taken in an ad 
hoc manner or are the product of long-term deliberations? In others words, are they 
employed tactically or strategically? Finally, what do we know about the duration of 
differentiated institutional, decision-making and policy arrangements? Is there really a 
gradual shift towards open-ended differentiation, so that what used to be seen as a 
temporary exception to the rule becomes a long-term norm, making an eventual move 
towards uniformity in institutions, procedures and policies increasingly less likely?  
 
It is clear that questions of this kind ultimately aim at situating the temporal patterns 
of differentiation within the broader development of integration and Europeanisation. 
To arrive at  a theoretically satisfying  account,  we need to turn to integration and 
Europeanisation theory.  
 
 
IV. How Time Shapes Differentiated Integration 
 
How  does  time  shape  differentiated  integration?  Whilst  the  previous  section  has 
drawn  attention  to  time  as  part  of  the  ‘dependent  variable’  of  differentiated 
integration, this section turns to the status of time in accounting for differentiated 
integration, which, in this section, is not restricted to temporal differentiation, but also   8 
encompasses,  in  Stubb’s  (1996)  categorisation,  differentiation  in  space  (variable 
geometry) and matter (à la carte).  
 
The general question of how time may promote, facilitate or impede differentiated 
integration raises a broad range of issues and the tentative answers suggested here are 
far from exhaustive. Two preliminary remarks help to frame the present discussion. 
First, in trying to understand how ‘time matters’, we need to engage with all three of 
the dimensions introduced in Section II, namely the impact of the passage of time; the 
impact of time budgets and time horizons; and, thirdly, time rules. For example, the 
passage of time plays a critical role in neo-functionalist accounts of integration with 
their emphasis on spill-overs; time horizons of actors are central to both historical 
institutionalist explanations of integration and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts 
with their stress on uncertainty about the future and credible commitments; and time 
rules  are  relevant  in  explaining  the  dynamics  of  EU  treaty  negotiations  and  their 
outcomes.  
 
Second,  when  we  discuss  the  status  of  time  in  explanations  of  differentiated 
integration, we ought to consider both integration and Europeanisation theory. The 
former  has  a  long  pedigree,  is  aimed  at  a  fairly  clear  explanandum  and  can  be 
characterised  with  reference  to  several  widely  recognised  schools  of  thought.  The 
latter is of more recent origin, its explanandum is very widely defined as change and 
continuity in the political systems of EU member state and countries  seeking EU 
accession  in  response  to  (the  prospect  of)  membership;  and  existing  theoretical 
accounts are arguably less developed, so that “there remains plenty of mileage in 
theorizing  Europeanization”  (Bulmer  2007:  57).  Yet,  both  complement  each  other 
when it comes to explaining the developmental dynamics of differentiated integration 
and the specific forms  - geographical, substantive and temporal – that it takes.  
 
 
IV. 1. Time in Integration Theory  
 
At first sight, theories of European integration may appear to give little consideration 
to role of time in integration, let alone differentiated integration. The lengthy subject 
indexes of major textbooks on integration theory do not contain entries on “time” 
(Rosamond  2000;  Wiener  and  Diez  2004,),  nor  do  collections  of  readings  on  the 
subject  (Nelsen  and  Stubb  1998;  O’Neill  1996).  Judging  by  its  index  alone,  the 
encyclopaedic Handbook of European Union Politics (Jørgensen et al. 2006), whose 
Part I is devoted to “theorising European integration”, would also appear to be silent 
on the subject. One might, therefore, be tempted to conclude that integration theory 
has little more to say on time and integration than that the latter is a historical process 
which takes place over time and that time is needed whether it is for functional and 
political spillovers to occur (as in neo-functionalism); lock-ins and path dependencies 
to  unfold  (as  in  historical  institutionalism);  or  norm  diffusion,  socialisation  and 
identity-building to develop (as stressed by constructivists).  
 
However,  such  an  easy  dismissal  would  be  fundamentally  misplaced,  for  a  more 
attentive  reading  offers  potentially  fruitful  insights.  Let  us  first  consider  neo-
functionalism  and  “neo-neofunctionalism”  (Schmitter  2004).  Both  passage  of  time 
and time rules feature in its explanatory account. Passage of time matters in at least 
two ways.  Neo-neofunctionalism is a “transformative theory”, which  assumes that   9 
“both actors and the ‘games they play’ will change significantly in the course of the 
integration  process”  (Schmitter  2004:  47).  Second,  and  perhaps  more  importantly, 
Schmitter (2004), building on work first published more than thirty years previously, 
has  sought  to  elucidate  the  temporal  logic  that  underlies  functional  spill-overs  in 
economic-social integration and the spill-over of the latter into political integration. In 
so doing, he has put emphasis on the fundamental importance of cycles, including 
“initiation  cycles”,  “priming  cycles”  and  “transforming  cycles”.  Whilst  initiation 
cycles constitute the start of the integration process, priming cycles are about changes 
that “define the context of a crisis that is compelling actors to change their strategies” 
(ibid.:  61),  including  differences  in  relative  size  and  power  of  states;  in  rates  of 
transaction;  in  member  internal  pluralism;  in  elite  value  complementarity;  and  in 
extra-regional  dependence  (ibid.).  During  a  “transformative  cycle”,  a  qualitative 
transformation takes place: the member states “will have exhausted the potentialities 
inherent in functionally integrating their economies and dedicate more and more of 
their efforts to functionally integrating their polities” (ibid.: 65-66). Writing in 2004, 
Schmitter suggested that it was “debatable” whether the EU had yet entered such a 
transformative cycle.  
 
In  the  context  of  our  present  interest  in  differentiated  integration,  it  is  especially 
relevant to note that the idea of a cyclical development is closely linked to notions of 
asynchronic change in the key variables that drive actors to change their strategies, i.e. 
issues  of  timing,  sequence,  speed  and  duration.  Thus,  Schmitter  hypothesises  that 
during priming cycles, asynchrony “in rates of change at the national level sets up – 
due to their differing marginal impacts – asynchrony in rates of regional change. This, 
in turn, enhances the probability that less convergent, and possibly divergent, actor 
strategies will be promoted and this makes the adoption of a joint policy vector more 
and more difficult”(64).  
 
Several implications flow from these suggestions. First, if it makes sense to think of 
European integration not as a linear but as a cyclical process, then it might also be 
instructive to explore evidence for differentiated integration as a cyclical phenomenon 
and to try to define the main stages in such cycles. Second, in thinking about such 
stages, it might be useful to refer to the idea of “interstitial institutional change”, as 
developed by Farrell and Héritier (2007). The decisive point here is to understand the 
dynamics of informal differentiation, on the one hand, and formal differentiation, on 
the other. A “cycle of differentiation” could be expected to come to an end, when the 
possibilities  for  informal  differentiation  within  a  given  Treaty  framework  are 
exhausted and Treaty revisions are required to either consolidate differentiation or 
move towards uniform integration. Third, the notion of asynchronic development in 
national conditions that shape integration – both within and across states – might help 
to  understand  the  emergence  of  demands  for  differentiation  and  the  durability  or 
transience of the latter.
3    
                                                 
3 Cycles are also accorded central analytical status in Wessels’s (1997) influential “fusion 
thesis”. Here cycles stand essentially for up-swings and down-swings within a process of 
linear  growth.  Progressive  integration  is  assessed  on  the  basis  of  “the  output  of  binding 
decisions, the scope of public policies, transfer of competencies, institutional and procedural 
patterns as well as the involvement and influence by intermediary groups” (275). Temporary 
down-swings are, in this analysis, part and parcel of the integration process as are temporary 
upswings. Yet, “in each of these upswings a ratchet effect can be witnessed”, i.e. the ‘acquis’ 
of  the  EC/EU  is  lifted  to  a  higher  plateau”  (285,  italics  in  the  original).  The  notion  of   10 
 
Time is, of course, also of central theoretical status in historical institutionalism. The 
locus classicus is Pierson’s (1996) historical institutionalist analysis of the “path to 
European integration”, but others, notably Bulmer (1998) and Armstrong and Bulmer 
(1998)  have  also  applied  insights  from  this  approach  to  explaining  “different 
dimensions  of  EU  governance”,  including  its  “political  and  legal  character;  the 
different types of change which are characteristic of a comparatively fragile system of 
governance like the EU, the embedding of policy-level governance structures within 
an  overarching,  systemic  structure  (the  EU);  and  the  normative  dimensions  of 
governance” (Bulmer 1998). As Pollack (2004) notes in the context of his discussion 
of  the  ‘new  institutionalism’  and  European  integration,  there  is  an  emphasis  on 
‘inertia,  or  lock-ins,  whereby  existing  institutions  may  remain  in  equilibrium  for 
extended periods of despite considerable political change; a critical role for timing 
and sequencing, in which relatively small and contingent events that occur at critical 
junctures  early  in  a  sequence  shape  (that  is,  provide  the  institutional  context  for) 
events  that  occur  later;  and  path-dependence,  in  which  early  choices  provide 
incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the 
past’ (ibid.: 140, emphases in the original).  
 
The  central  substantive  argument  put  forward  by  Pierson  is  that  the  historical 
development of European integration is characterised by the recurrent opening up of 
gaps  in  member  state  control  “over  the  evolution  of  European  institutions  and 
policies”; during those gaps, actors other than the member states, in particular the 
supranational actors, gain in influence. This is a process that the member states find 
very  difficult  to  reverse,  because  supranational  actors  will  try  to  fight  any  such 
reversal; because of institutional barriers to reforms that would reassert control; and 
because of sunk costs and the rising price of exit (Pierson 1996). When “European 
integration is examined over time, the gaps in member-state control appear far more 
prominent than they do in intergovernmentalist accounts”. Crucial to the opening up 
of  these  gaps  is  that  domestic  political  decision-makers  tend  to  have  short  time 
horizons: “long-term institutional consequences are often the by-products of actions 
taken for short-term political reasons” (ibid.).  
 
Pierson’s account can be read to imply distinct patterns of differentiated integration: 
we would expect differentiated integration to flourish during phases of strong member 
state control, but become less prominent during “gaps”, when supranational actors 
may  assert  themselves.  Moreover,  the  historical  institutionalist  account  provides  a 
potential explanation for why we can expect such a patterning over time, which is 
itself grounded in temporal considerations, namely the differences between short-term 
time horizons of state actors and the long-term, often unintended consequences of 
their actions.      
 
                                                                                                                                            
upswings and downswings again draws our attention to the question of whether differentiated 
integration is to be regarded as an up-swing phenomenon (differentiation as a step towards 
full integration) or a more closely associated with periods of down-swing in the integration 
process (i.e. a sign of disintegration). A key question would then be to what extent the cycles 
that Wessels’s identifies are linked to changes in patterns of differentiated integration.  
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Turning to liberal intergovernmentalism it may at first appear largely insensitive to 
time  in  its  explanatory  account  of  the  integration  trajectory.  Liberal 
intergovernmentalism, as exemplified by Moravcsik’s (1998) work, treats time as the 
specific historical circumstances in which intergovernmental negotiations take place. 
EU integration can, therefore, “best be explained as a series of rational choices made 
by national leaders” (ibid.: 18). These choices are thought to respond to “constraints 
and  opportunities  stemming  from  economic  interests  of  powerful  domestic 
constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role 
of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments” 
(ibid.: 18). Clearly, all of these three factors can change over time, but, as critics of 
liberal  intergovernmentalism  have  pointed  out,  liberal  intergovernmentalism  in  its 
ontology is reproductive “since the key assumptions are that dominant actors remain 
sovereign national states pursuing their unitary national interests and controlling the 
pace  and  outcomes  through  periodic  revisions  of  their  mutual  treaty  obligations” 
(Schmitter 2004: 47).  
 
However, liberal intergovernmentalism is time-sensitive in another respect: whilst the 
passage of time may not transform the game being played, and time rules are not 
central to its analysis of interstate bargaining processes, it is crucial in explaining 
decisions on ‘institutional choice’, i.e. pooling and delegation of sovereignty, insofar 
as these decisions are motivated by a desire for ‘credible commitments’. Thus, the 
theory of credible commitments posits that delegation and pooling are “designed to 
precommit  governments  to  a  stream  of  future  decisions  by  removing  them  from 
unilateral control of individual governments (…) Governments are likely to accept 
pooling or delegation as a means to assure that other governments will accept agreed 
legislation  and  enforcement,  to  signal  their  own  credibility,  or  to  lock  in  future 
decisions against domestic opposition’ (ibid.: 73).  
 
Credible  commitments  as  a  way  to  ‘control’  the  future  are,  thus,  central  to 
Moravscik’s  account  of  the  trajectory  of  European  integration  and  differentiated 
integration – in addition to reflecting economic interests and the power of member 
states – needs to be understood as a result of calculations about the future. Temporal 
differentiation  (“multi-speed  Europe”),  geographical  differentiation  (“variable 
geometry”) and sectoral differentiation (à la carte) could be seen, in particular, to 
reflect differences amongst the member states in the willingness or capacity both to 
signal credibility and to lock in future decisions. As Moravscik himself highlights, 
“the credibility explanation predicts that delegation and pooling will vary by issue and 




IV.2. Time in Europeanisation Theory 
 
Compared to integration theory, theoretical accounts of Europeanisation are of more 
recent origins. Bulmer (2007) has pointed out that they are principally grounded in 
different  variants  of  the  new  institutionalism  -  rational  choice,  historical  and 
sociological – but, although all three are, in principle, suited to incorporate time in 
their  explanatory  accounts  of  processes  and  patterns  of  Europeanisation,  temporal 
categories have not featured prominently in the leading accounts. In his discussion of 
“key problems” in the theorization of Europeanisation, Bulmer (ibid: 53) highlights   12 
the “under-representation of the classic HI [historical institutionalist] themes of time, 
timing and tempo”. Similarly, Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2008), in a recent detailed 
review of studies on the Europeanisation of national parliaments and executives, have 
highlighted that foregrounding time in causal accounts of Europeanization may help 
to make sense of cross-temporal, cross-sectoral and cross-country patterns that may 
otherwise remain difficult to explain.   
 
One attempt to engage with this challenge is Goetz’s (2006, 2007) analysis of cross-
country  patterns  of  ‘clustered  Europeanization’,  which  employs  time  as  a  ‘distant 
variable’.  Many  of  the  policy  aspects  of  differentiated  integration  –  such  as 
derogations,  transitional  arrangements  or  opt-outs  –  can  be  understood  as  part  of 
distinct Europeanisation patterns, although the above-noted analyses of clustering did 
not examine this aspect explicitly.  
 
Non-convergence amongst the EU member states, despite a wide range of integration 
effects,  has  come  to  be  accepted  as  conventional  wisdom  in  the  Europeanization 
debate. This literature follows in the footsteps of the work by Héritier et al. (2001), 
who highlighted “differential responses to European policies” and tried to solve the 
puzzle  why  ‘members  states’  policies  (…)  respond  so  differently  to  identical 
European  policy  demands  and  similar  external  and  internal  conditions’  (p.  257). 
Goetz (2006, 2007) questions this predominant stress on non-convergence and makes 
a case for ‘clustered Europeanization’, i.e. the existence of multi-country groupings 
that are characterized by high levels of intra-regional commonality and inter-regional 
differences in both the substance and modes of Europeanization. This clustering is 
said to have been promoted by the interaction of two ‘distant’ variables: territory and 
temporality.  Territory  influences  Europeanization  primarily  through  ‘families  of 
nation’  and  center-periphery  structures  in  an  expanding  European  political  space 
(Goetz 2007). Temporality matters in at least three ways: the timing of accession in 
relation to domestic political and economic development; timing in relation to the 
phase of European integration; and speed and duration of the accession process. In 
combination,  territory  and  temporality  sustain  and  even  promote  intra-regional 
commonalities  in  Europeanization-related  domestic  variables  and  inter-regional 
differences in the integration experience. To be sure: territory and temporality are not 
alternatives  to  the  dominant  domestic  and  integration-related  explanations  of 
Europeanization. Rather, once territory and temporality are considered systematically, 
it  becomes  clear  that  they  promote  clustering  in  the  more  proximate  domestic 
variables and integration patterns. This clustering of proximate explanatory variables, 
in turn, promotes clustered Europeanization.  
 
The basic proposition advanced is simple: successive enlargements have followed a 
fairly clear regional pattern, integrating groups of countries that already shared many 
important  political  and  socio-economic  characteristics.  Their  Europeanization 
experience is likely to have reinforced this distinctness for three main reasons. First, 
whilst Europeanization interacted strongly with democratization and socio-economic 
modernization in some cases, it did not do so in others. Put differently, whilst in some 
cases democratic political consolidation and socio-economic modernisation preceded 
integration  (Nordic  enlargement  is  a  case  in  point),  in  the  Southern  and  CEE 
enlargements integration coincided with democratisation and modernisation. Second, 
regionally-based,  multi-country  groupings  joined  the  EU  at  distinct  phases  of 
European  integration.  Third,  the  speed  and  duration  of  the  accession  process  and   13 
negotiation processes differed from one enlargement to the other, which is likely to 
have had an impact on the demand for temporal differentiation, in particular.  
   
The  ‘relative  time  of  accession’  has  received  special  attention  in  the  case  of  the 
Southern  European  enlargement  of  the  1980s  (for  references  see  Goetz  2007). 
Accounts of the Southern Europeanization experience routinely note the interaction 
between  integration,  post-authoritarian  democratization  and  socio-economic 
modernization, which has been present in the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish cases. In 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  these  processes  are  likewise  closely  entangled.  This 
coincidence,  or,  conversely,  its  absence,  has  ambiguous  consequences.  Countries 
emerging from authoritarian dictatorship face a greater adaptive challenge on their 
paths  towards  the  EU  than  consolidated  democracies;  where  democratization  goes 
hand in hand with a transformation of the economy, as has been the case in Central 
and Eastern Europe, adaptive pressures will be further heightened. The likelihood of 
‘misfits’ has increased over time, as ‘democratic conditionality’ has moved centre 
stage and the political and economic acquis of the EU has expanded and deepened. 
The  hurdles  to  accession  have  been  raised  considerably  between  the  Southern 
enlargements of the 1980s and the CEE enlargements of the 2000s, as has been the 
insistence  of  existing  member  states  to  impose  major  costs  of  adaptation  on 
prospective new members prior to accession. Countries in which Europeanization, 
democratization and economic liberalization closely interact, are also more likely find 
themselves  in  the  position  of  policy  takers  rather  than  policy  shapers,  not  least 
because  they  lack  the  strong  domestic  institutional  foundations  of  consolidated 
democracies.  This  is  also  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  participation  of  organized 
interests and civil society in the shaping of European policy is limited.  
 
Adaptive pressures and a strong orientation towards ‘policy-taking’ take place in the 
context of still malleable domestic institutions. Put differently, the European project 
does  not  encounter  a  set  of  historically  validated  and  deeply  entrenched  domestic 
political  institutions.  Under  these  circumstances,  ‘Europe’  can  become  a  decisive 
ideational  reference  point  both  for  domestic  reform  and  in  the  quest  for  the 
legitimation  of  the  newly  established  domestic  institutions.  This  contribution  is 
critical  in  shifting  the  balance  between  the  costs  and  benefits  of  Europeanization 
decisively in favour of the later.    
 
Where  integration  does  not  coincide  with  democratisation  and  liberalisation,  the 
pressures for adaptation are likely to be much lower, but domestic institutional and 
policy  inertia  will  be  higher.  Mature  liberal  democracies  with  developed  market 
economies have no problems meeting the EU’s democracy criteria and will face only 
moderate ‘misfit’ in EU regulatory policies. Joining the EU with a consolidated set of 
domestic  institutions,  countries  such  as  Denmark,  Sweden  or  the  UK  were  well-
placed  to  take  on  the  role  of  policy-shapers,  further  reducing  misfit  pressures. 
Moreover, building on a national traditions of the participation of interest and civil 
society groups in public policy-making, domestic EU policy-making is set to follow a 
more pluralist pattern. At the same time, however, gains from EU membership in 
terms  of  democracy  are  absent  and  Europe  as  an  ideational  reference  point  in 
domestic political discourse features less prominently. In the absence of a contribution 
of EU membership to democracy, any cost-benefit calculation is skewed towards the 
regulatory dimension.  
   14 
These brief remarks already underline that there is a second key aspect to the ‘relative 
time’ of accession, which concerns the phase of integration during which groups of 
countries join. That length of membership matters both in terms of substantive effects 
- their configuration and their depth - and in modes and processes of Europeanization 
- strategic adaptation versus socialization and learning (Börzel/Risse 2003) - seems 
uncontroversial.  The  point  to  be  emphasized  here  is  that  early  Europeanization 
effects, reflecting, in part, the nature of the EU at the time of joining, are likely to 
result in path dependencies that influence Europeanization trajectories over time. For 
example, countries that joined the EU at a time when ‘integration through law’ was 
the predominant form of EU policy-making, might find it more difficult to reorient 
their  domestic  arrangements  towards  new  governance  instruments  than  those  that 
have had to confront a more diverse policy repertoire from the beginning. Similarly, 
countries that joined the EU at a time when the domestic costs of integration could be 
cushioned  by  large  transfer  payments  are  likely  to  develop  different  patterns  of 
domestic  mobilization than  those  in  which  early  adaptational  costs  remain  largely 
uncompensated.  
 
Finally, there are good reasons to assume that the speed and duration of the accession 
process overall, and of the accession negotiations, in particular, matter. Thus, it has 
been suggested that in the CEE enlargement of 2005, the long-drawn out process of 
the “return to Europe”, the uses of time as part of the Commission’s enlargement 
strategy (Avery 2009) and conditionality combined to ensure that many of the costs of 
adaptation to the acquis accrued prior to accession.  
 
Several implications flow from these remarks. First, the ‘relative time of accession’ is 
likely to matter when it comes to pressures for, and resistance, against institutional, 
decision-making  and  policy  arrangements  that  imply  territorial,  functional  and 
temporal differentiation. Where democracy and market economy precede the quest for 
accession,  demands  for  transitional  arrangements,  temporary  derogations  and  the 
phasing in of policies are likely to be much less pressing than where they coincide. 
But  to  the  extent  that  demands  for  differentiation  are  made  by  consolidated 
democracies, they are likely to favour permanence – in the sense of opt-outs - rather 
than  temporary  measures,  since  “misfits”  will  be  more  deeply  embedded  in  their 
institutional and policy traditions than is the case in “transitional” political systems.  
 
Second,  open-ended  “temporary”  arrangements  –  i.e.  those  which  are  regarded  as 
temporary in principle, but without a fixed end-date - are likely to be increasingly 
difficult to abolish as time goes on and national interest coalitions form around them. 
This observation applies, in particular, in the case of fully consolidated democracies.   
 
Third, insistence on the full adoption of the acquis at the time of accession in the case 
of  non-consolidated  democracies  may  come  at  the  cost  of  “shallow 
institutionalisation”  that  follows  a  “logic  of  reversibility”  (Goetz  2005;  Dimitrov, 
Goetz and Wollmann 2006). Thus, post-accession gaps in institutional arrangements 
and policy practices are more likely to open up where the instruments of temporal 
differentiation have not been used.   
 
 
V. The EU Timescape, Pluritemporality and Differentiated Integration  
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Another fruitful way to think about the impact of time on differentiated integration 
may  be  opened  up  by  paying  attention  to  the  specificities  of  the  EU  timescape 
(Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009) and how these might promote functional, territorial 
and also temporal differentiation.
4 A timescape has been defined by Barbara Adam 
(2004: 143) as “a cluster of temporal features, each implicated in all the others, but 
not necessarily of equal importance in each instance”. Political timescapes reflect the 
manner in which time is institutionalised in a political system along the polity, politics 
and policy dimensions. They are concerned, in particular, with the term lengths of 
political and senior administrative officeholders, their time budgets and time horizons; 
the formal and informal rules that govern the timing, sequence, speed and duration of 
political decision-making processes: and the temporal properties of public policy.  
 
There are several features of the EU timescape that deserve attention in the present 
context (for an extended discussion see Goetz 2009; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009; 
Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009). First, there is no dominant political time-setter in the 
EU and no dominant institutional and policy cycle. In national politics, the electoral 
cycle mobilises actors and synchronises them at the same time. The absence of a 
similarly dominant cycle at EU level makes both mobilisation and synchronisation, as 
key regulatory and steering functions of political time, especially arduous. Second, 
EU political time often has a decidedly linear character; where institutional and policy 
cycles exist, they tend to be extended and their discontinuous effects attenuated. There 
is  a  strong  element  on  linearity  and  ongoingness  to  the  EU’s  workings,  and  the 
Commission, in particular, can often afford to take “the long view”.  
 
Third,  the  EU’s  Eigenzeit  is  fragile  and  sensitive  to  external  influences,  the  most 
important of which are the political and, in particular, electoral calendars of the major 
member states. Temporal autonomy becomes more difficult to establish and maintain, 
the greater the number of member states and, probably more importantly, the more 
EU level decisions become subject to partisan and electoral competition within the 
member  states.  Fourth,  there  is  intense  intra-institutional  and  interinstitutional 
bargaining over institutional and policy timetables; the latter, especially with long 
time horizons and fixed dates and sequences, assume a crucial role as commitment 
and compliance tools, as the example of enlargement governance highlights (Avery 
2009). By structuring the future, they seek to bind future entrants in decision-making. 
Governing by timetable is, thus, a key feature of the EU policy process.  
 
Finally, despite frequent recourse to governing by timetable, the ability of the EU to 
realise its temporal preferences vis-à-vis the member states is limited as is its ability to 
restrict de facto temporal differentiation – e.g., in moving towards the goals of the 
Lisbon agenda, the reduction in national public debt, or compliance with transposition 
deadlines. 
 
                                                 
4 I am aware of the potential for confusion and circularity in argument that may arise from the 
presence of time both in the ‘independent variable’ – here: the specific character of the EU 
timescape – and the ‘dependent variable’ – here: differentiated integration, which includes, 
but is not, of course, restricted to, temporal differentiation. However, the key characteristics 
of the EU timescape I wish to highlight are different from the temporal properties of 
differentiated integration.  
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These features of the EU timescape are likely to have important consequences for 
functional, territorial and also temporal differentiation. To begin with, the absence of 
a dominant time setter and of a dominant institutional and policy cycle means that the 
EU timescape is able to accommodate a considerable degree of functional and also 
temporal differentiation. Whilst in domestic contexts, elections largely set a common 
clock for national policy-makers, in the EU key institutions run on different clocks 
and different policy areas develop distinct Eigenzeiten (see Dyson 2008, 2009). This 
makes mobilisation and synchronisation often difficult; but is also reduces the need 
for inter-sectoral co-ordination and the need to fit institutional development, decision-
making  and  policy  development  within  a  strongly  cyclical  political  calendar.  The 
manner  in  which  political  time  is  institutionalised  in  the  EU  is,  therefore,  better 
equipped to tolerate pluritemporality, i.e. the co-existence of multiple political times 
in its institutions, decision-making procedures and in policy development than most 
domestic political system with a dominant electoral clock.  
 
Linear political time tends to increase the time budgets of key actors – notably the 
Commission and the EP – and, by implication, their time horizons. It is precisely this 
ability  to  “take  the  long  view”  which  promotes  the  acceptance  of  “provisional” 
solutions in the form of à la carte participation or differences in the timing, speed and 
sequences  that  member  follow  in  the  pursuit  of  common  goals  (temporal 
differentiation). In a political system in which time horizons are extended, it is more 
acceptable to wait for “eventual participation” than where the time budgets and time 
horizons of the key actors are strongly bounded by elections (see Koelliker 2006, who 
discusses the calculations surrounding ‘eventual participation’). 
 
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  although  EU  political  time  reaches  deeply  into  the 
institutional timetables of the member states, notably of executives (Ekengren 2002), 
the EU is as much a “time-taker” from the member states as it is a “time-setter”. For 
example, despite a highly developed system of surveillance of the member states’ 
budgets and a very elaborate system of time rules designed to ensure compliance with 
the Stability and Growth Pact, national political calendars have repeatedly proved 
more powerful than the clocks of the Pact (Dyson 2009). Cross-country differences in 
compliance  with  transposition  deadlines  and,  in  particular,  questions  over  timely 
substantive implementation also underline the limitations to EU control over political 
time in the member states. For example, in their work on labour law directives in both 
old  and  new  member  states,  Falkner  et  al.  (2005)  identified  three  “worlds  of 
compliance”,  consisting  of  a  “world  of  law  observance”,  a  “world  of  domestic 
politics”,  and  a  “world  of  neglect”.  In  their  most  recent  work,  they  add  a  fourth 
“world of dead letters” (2008). What these and many other findings on transposition 
and implementation indicate is that there is a great deal of de facto differentiation that 
the Commission is either unable or unwilling to contain.         
 
 
VI. Conclusion: Taking Time Seriously  
Why is it important to focus on time in discussions of differentiated integration? This 
paper has suggested three main answers to this question. First, time is an important 
property  of  differentiated  integration,  taking  the  form  of  patterns  of  temporal 
differentiation  and  temporal  patterns  of  differentiation.  Second,  time  is  a  critical 
‘independent variable’ in accounts of integration and has also featured in analyses of   17 
Europeanisation. Its full implications for differentiated integration certainly need to be 
worked out in more detail than has been possible here; but its potential explanatory 
power  should  have  become  apparent.  Third,  the  EU  timescape  –  at  the  level  of 
institutions,  decision-making  procedures  and  policies  –  offers  a  favourable 
environment for asynchronic integration. Put differently: the manner in which ‘the EU 
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